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THIRD-PARTY TRIAL OBSERVERS:
A Proposal for Codification and Implementation of
International Procedural Due Process in the Americast
by Jay D. Terry*
I. THE PROBLEM
0 VER TWENTY YEARs have passed now since Mrs. Franklin D.
Roosevelt expressed the hope that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights "may well become the international Magna Carta of all
men everywhere."' In the same breath, she recognized that the Universal
Declaration did not "purport to be a statement of law or of legal
obligation." But the members of the world community had unanimously
enumerated the rights of men and all that remained was for men of good
will to provide for the effective implementation of those rights.
That goal has been largely unmet on the worldwide level. 2 A
discussion of the production of materials and setting of precedents at the
level of the United Nations and its organs is not to be within the scope of
this article. The proliferating snowfall of declarations, covenants and draft
conventions is worthy of note, praise and extended examination, but that
States have been loathe to track into that virginal landscape with steps of
implementation is beyond cavil. Even in the event of the entry into force
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights3
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,4 precious
little implementation would be realized. The former instrument provides
in Article 16 merely for reporting, while Article 41 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political and the Optional Protocol thereto 5 add the possibility
of conciliation to the reporting provisions of Article 40.
If human rights are to become meaningful to the individual, if the
t The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not constitute any official
position of the United States Air Force.
* Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Air Force, International Law Division Office of the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force. LL.B., Georgetown University; LL.M. (Inter-
national Law), New York University.
1 Address by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.N. General Assembly, Paris, December
9, 1948. In Dep't State Bull., at 751-752 (Dec. 19, 1948).
2 See Section XI, Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-
27, 1968, reprinted in 9 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists 94, at 105.
Compare the classifications and discussions of various methods and techniques in
John Carey, Procedures for International Protection of Human Rights, 53 Iowa
L. Rev. 291 (1967).
3 C.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. CAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
41d. at 52.
5ld. at 59.
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individual is to ever truly become a "subject" of international law rather
than remain an "object," 6 the most effective mechanism would be
compulsory third-party decision-making to settle disputes between
individuals and States when those disputes sound in international law.7
But to say that "governments are not presently inclined to place a high
priority on developing effective machinery on a global scale for imple-
menting human rights" is to perhaps understate reality. The United
States' fealty to the spirit of the Connelly Reservation remains hardened, 9
the socialist States' refusal to internationalize the procedural and substan-
tive law of human rights has scarcely been impaired by their ratifications
of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,10 and the
Afro-Asian remembrance of things past offers, to their perception, little
likelihood of impartial decision-making by nonregional referees.
It is submitted, then, that one must leave the world stage and search
in the wings if meaningful implementation is to be found.
II. A MODEST POINT OF ATTACK FOR THE AMERICAS
It is proposed that there be an Inter-American codification of an
"international minimum standard" of criminal procedural due process
with a supplementary protocol establishing a body of trial observers in
the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The
Commission would be open to petitions from nationals of Inter-American
States who are being prosecuted in the courts of a State signatory of the
protocol which is not the State of their nationality. An observer, legally
trained and a national of a third State, would be assigned by the Commis-
sion to observe all public proceedings in the case. He would thereafter file
with the Commission a report in regard to the degree in which the
proceedings complied with the "international minimum standard." Similar
reports would be filed in conjunction with any appellate proceedings. A
possible developmental plan for enforcement procedures will be discussed
in Section V, infra.
Having eschewed the more traditional technique of suspensefully
saving the defined proposal for the last few paragraphs, my reverse
6 Regarding "subjects" and "objects" of international law generally, see I Oppenheim's
International Law, 13-22, 636-639 (8th. ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
7 See Thomas M. Franck, The Structure of Impartiality, 31-43 (1968). The essential
thrust of this paper, i.e. impartial observation in a regional setting of aliens' rights to
procedural due process, found its genesis in the conceptualizations of this volume.
8 William Korey, The Key to Human Rights-Implementation International Concilia-
tion 65 (November 1968).
9 Richard N. Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907 (October 1967). For
text of United States Declaration Recognizing the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court, which reserved to the United States the determination of
"domestic jurisdiction," see U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, Sep. 8, 1946, 452-453.
10 John Carey, Implementing Human Rights Conventions-The Soviet View, 53 Ky.
L.J. 115 (1964).
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approach will allow me to now set forth the considerations engendering
the proposal with somewhat clearer conceptual linkage. Subsequent
Sections will be devoted to guidelines for a minimum standard and
outlining a precedent for an institutionalized mechanism of international
observation of "criminal" procedural due process in an alien's trial.
Justifications for Proposal
(A). Regional Application. As discussed in Section I, supra, "(t)he
majority of U.N. members are clearly not prepared to permit their citizens
to appeal over their heads to international judicial bodies."11 State practice
under at least one regional apparatus, however, has shown a striking lack
of such constraint. During the eighteen years since the signing of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 2 the European Commission on Human Rights has
registered over 3,700 cases brought against member States by individuals
or groups of individuals. 13 Of these, 50 cases have been deemed by the
Commission, after submission to the State concerned for its observations,
sufficiently meritorious for reference to the Committee of Ministers or
the European Court of Human Rights.' 4 The Court has decided three
cases arising from individual or group complaints. 15 Although, under
Article 4816 of the Convention, individuals are not defined as a party
before the Court, that body "has clearly treated the petitioner's interests
as those of a party.' l7 All of the State Parties to the Convention who
recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 8 have undertaken to
abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties.19
Although not possessing the structured organs for implementation as
11 Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order, 256 (1964). Mr. Gardner believes
the international condition sufficiently bleak as to require shunting aside of hopes toimplement by treaties with concentration solely on informal techniques for information
and persuasion.
32 Signed at Rome on 4 November 1950, 213 United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S.)
222.
13 A. B. McNulty (Secretary to the European Commission on Human Rights), The
Establishment of Procedures and Institutions for the International Protection of
Human Rights: The European Approach, undated and unpublished, at 4.
14 Id.
l5 Lawless Case (Merits), European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of July 1,
1961, 4 European Commission of Human Rights, Documents and Decisions 438(1961); De Becker Case, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of March
27, 1962, 5 European Commission of Human Rights, Documents and Decisions, 320(1962); Belgian Linguistic Cases (Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 2126/64),
decided by European Court of Human Rights on July 23, 1968, no citation available.16 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 222 at 246.
17 A. Luini del Russo, International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Appraisal,
9 Win. & Mary L.R., 749, at 755.
18 Article 46, Convention, supra, note 16 at 246.
19 Article 53, Convention, supra, note 16 at 248.
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are seen in Western Europe, the Inter-American region has haltingly
begun the march. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
since its establishment in 1959,20 has won a position of respect due to its
insistent and impartial investigations into complaints from individuals.21 It
reached this position through exerting extreme leverage on its own
bootstraps rather than by virtue of the powers granted in its original
Charter,22 but certain of the Commission's trail-blazing has been ratified
by an amended Charter.23
A highly significant current development in the Americas is the
Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights which was
prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and
concluded at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human
Rights, held at San Jose, Costa Rica, November 1969.2 Although
structured on the European model of Convention, Commission, and
Court, certain very important variations will be mentioned later in the
article. It should be noted here, however, that only exuberant optimism
would allow a prediction of early adoption throughout the OAS consider-
ing that an earlier draft languished for six years before the Second
Special Conference in Rio in 1965 decided that the passage of time
necessitated revision of the yet unconsidered draft.25
It appears, then, that nations of a regional organization, though they
be heterogeneous in economic development and cultural backgrounds,
including a mixture of civil law and common law heritages, are sufficiently
bound together in their social and political problems and aims to give
common cause to the solution of violations of human rights.
(B). Denationalization of the Dispute. It is well-established in
customary international law that a host State is responsible to the home
20 Resolution VIII, Part 2, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Santiago, Chile, August 12-18, 1959, OEA/SER.C/II.5.
21 See generally as to the jurisdiction and workings of the Commission, Durwood
V. Sandifer, Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 11 How. L.J. 509 (1965)
and Donald T. Fox, Doctrinal Development in the Americas: From Non-Intervention
to Collective Support for Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U.J. Intl. L. & Pol. 44 (1968).
22 Article 9, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved
by the Council of the OAS, May 25, 1960, as amended June 8, 1960, OEA/SER.L
/V/I.4 Rev.
23Compare Article 9 (bis) of the Statute as amended by Res. XXII of the Second
Special Inter-American Conference, April 19, 1966, OEA/SER.L/V/II.14, Doc. 33.
24 The text of the Convention is reproduced in 9 International Legal Materials 673
(1970). On November 22, 1969, representatives of the following countries signed the
Convention: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Convention
was ratified by Costa Rica on April 8, 1970. Ratification or adherence by eleven states
is required for the Convention to enter into force (Art. 74). Other documents
pertaining to the Convention appear at 9 International Legal Materials, 123, 128,
and 710 (1970).
25 Fox, supra, note 21 at 54-55.
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State when an alien has suffered injury or damage by an act or omission
attributable to the host State, if such act or omission is wrongful under
international law.26 Without examining the bare rule in detail, let it suffice
to note that the home State is the injured party, not the alien,27 and the
home State may not generally claim a wrong until the alien has "exhausted
the local remedies. '28 The first condition is unjustly anachronistic while
the second, when rigidly applied in the case of procedural due process,
enervates the alien's claims with staleness.
The fiction of the wrong to the State should be quickly buried by the
three grotesque burdens laid on it by definition and practice.
(1) It is logically unsound.29 There could never be international
culpability (beneath the level of Nuremberg) for a wrong to a stateless
person. The illogic shines brightest in regard to the measure of damages.
It never bears relationship to the worth of the alien to his home State but
simply reflects the loss caused to the alien or his survivors.
2 0
(2) It tends to magnify the importance of the dispute by national-
izing the dispute and the remedy process. There occurs an unreasonable
"heating" of the problem and makes possible an unnecessary chance
that the States will identify the issues with their national economic or
social interests rather than retaining the true perspective of an individual
against a foreign State.31
(3) It subjects the remedy of the truly injured party to the whim,
caprice and political interest of his home State.3 2 The home State is totally
in control of the case. It may refuse to intervene, or it may even "waive"
the injury. Its action may be motivated by many conditions between the
two States completely extrinsic to the merits of the case. Such a condition
is intolerable at a point in time twenty years after every then extant nation
in this region proclaimed certain rights as human rights.
The general inability of the alien to seek assistance prior to
exhausting the local remedies must obviously remain basically in effect. A
plan whose object is to sponsor international cooperation and to instill
trust in supranational agencies could scarcely survive meddling or
26 1. Oppenheim, supra, note 6 at 336 ff.
27 Id. at 339-340.
28 Id. at 361-362. Note the exception if local remedies are substantially ineffective or
there exists no likelihood of an effective remedy (362).
29 At least to this Western perceiver, but see generally Carey, supra, note 10. Thus
even my modest proposal would appear to be totally unacceptable to a Communist
Cuba if they ever chose or were allowed to resume functioning within the OAS
structure.
30 Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 99 (1952).
31 See generally on denationalization of disputes Franck, supra, note 7, Chapter 7,
particularly in regard to the danger of "hot" disputes (218-219).
32 Frederick S. Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, 1941 Am. Soc. Int. L.
Proc. 14, at 18.
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interference with the orderly and regulated workings of a national judicial
system. But it is imperative that there be impartial observation and
recording of factual data at the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.
Otherwise, vacuity of the record may render meaningless and empty
the best-laid structures of dispute settlement and implementation of
rights. This point will be further discussed in reviewing the operation
of the proposed observer system.
(C). Amenability for Third-Party Decision-Making. But though it be
agreed wise to cease the fictional substitution of a "wronged" State in
place of the truly injured person, why the seemingly arbitrary selection
of criminal due process for aliens as the area proposed to be observed and
implemented. Justification of the subject area is obviously crucial to the
question of State acceptance of the plan. I believe that the following
considerations support the plan's feasibility for adoption.
(1) The home State has a genuine claim to interest in the settlement
of the dispute. In the abstract, States are concerned with the treatment
rendered their nationals in a foreign country. At the time of a given
criminal prosecution this interest may be totally lacking, save for purely
political reasons. But in considering adoption of the proposed plan, the
possibility of a case arousing real and genuine concern should be apparent
to the States. These are disputes then that States want to see settled.
Similarly, by limiting the plan to rights of aliens, the subject area is
removed from one of solely "domestic concern" to the forum state.
33
Thus the subject matter is singularly appropriate for third-party
supranational settlement.
(2) The rights involved are nonpolitical and nonsubstantive, and
are not joined to vital national interests. As mentioned previously,
these are not "hot" disputes. Within the national frame of reference, they
are conceptually understood as individual rights, as restraints on the
State, and are not schematically joined with State interests. This ingrained
belief as to how the rights exist and for whose benefit, should facilitate
acceptance. Furthermore, and most importantly, in envisaging the
prospect of its national losing (or at least not winning) a claim before an
international decision-maker as to a violation of such rights, a State
considering adoption of the proposed plan will not likely be apoplectic
over the possibility. This is simply to say that disputants must be prepared
to lose (or at least not to win) before they can be ready for third-party
decision-making. 34 Although the proposal, of course, will oust the home
State from the arena of disputation, we obviously cannot reach that
stage without the home State being psychologically prepared to assent
to its ejection.
33 Supra, note 9.
34 Franck, supra, note 7 at 300, 306.
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(3) There is a tradition of national and international implementation
of procedural due process rights and a wealth of material from which to
draw perceivable standards.35 It is far easier for one to accept a line of
conduct outside his house if he has grown used to seeing the same
procedure as part of the conduct of his in-group. Both civil-law and
common-law States are accustomed to rights of procedural due process
being treated as inherently belonging to the individual, acting as restraints
on State conduct, and being susceptable to third-party settlement.
Internationally, the members of the Inter-American community have
traditionally provided for consular assistance to the alien, 3 enumeration
of certain procedural rights37 and third-party settlement of disputes
relating thereto.3 8
III. REASONS AND SOURCES FOR A CODIFIED
INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD
Prior to 1950, no multilateral convention had attempted to prescribe
specific procedural safeguards to apply during the trial of an alien and the
denial of which would constitute a violation of international law. As
discussed previously [Sec. II (B) supra], the rule had long been established
that an act or omission violative of international law and causing injury
to an alien could result in the host State becoming responsible to the
alien's home State. An example of a violative act would be a "denial of
justice." The following will serve as a working definition:
A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial ofjustice. Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted
delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency in the
administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those
guarantees which are generally considered indispensable to the proper
administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust judgment. An error
of a national court which does not produce manifest injustice is not
a denial of justice. (emphasis supplied) 39
The long wait for any specific delineation of the somewhat amorphic,
3 See Sec. III, inira. As to the absolute necessity of perceivable standards to guideimpartial third-party decision-makers, see Franck, supra, note 7 at 122.
36 Article 1, Inter-American Consular Agents Convention of 1928, Treaty Series
No. 843, 47 Stat. 1976, reprinted in H.P. de Vries and J. Rodriquez-Novas, The
Law of the Americas, 265 (1965).
3 7 
e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of
America and the Republic of Nicaragua. (Entered into force May 24, 1958). U.S.T.449, 367 U.N.T.S. 3. In Article 3 thereof the Parties list prompt notification of the
charges, speedy trial and right to selected counsel.
38 Id. Article 24, para. 2, states that disputes as to interpretation or application of the
treaty, lacking diplomatic resolution, shall be submitted by the Parties to the I.C.J.,
unless they agree to some other pacific settlement.
39 Article 9, Draft of Convention on the Responsibility of States for Damage Done in
Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 Am. J. Intl. L. (Spec.
Supp.) 133, 134 (1929).
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"generally considered indispensable," guarantees was caused by a basic
disagreement between two sets of States-those favoring a "national
treatment" and those espousing contrarily the application of a "minimum
standard." 4
0
The "national standard" was based on the theorem that customary
international law provided no greater safeguards for aliens than for
nationals and, therefore, an international wrong was committed only if the
host State denied to an alien some procedural safeguard to which its
nationals were entitled.41
On the other hand, the exponents of a "minimum standard" claimed
a rule of customary international law providing for a minimum standard
of procedural justice which nations had a duty to accord all aliens.'
Consequently, if a State violated this minimum standard in its treatment
of aliens it would not be entitled to the defense that its nationals were
similarly treated. 43 The classic statement of the standard was thusly:
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of
such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part
of the international law of the world. The condition upon which any
country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by
the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its system of
law and administration shall conform to this general standard. If any
country's system of law and administration does not conform to that
standard, although the people of the country may be content or com-
pelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept
it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens.
44
In considering the feasibility of the two theories, it may first be
fairly said that neither ever assumed the binding character of international
customary law.45
The "national standard" relegates international law to a handmaiden
of municipal law in that the State claims a perfect right to impose, across
the board, a standard with as low quality safeguards as it sees fit.
But if we desire to guarantee a uniform standard to the alien, what
is it we guarantee by the "minimum standard"? What is this standard,
40 See generally Andreas H. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International Law
Applied to Aliens, 62-111 (1944); Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum Standard" of the
Treatment of Aliens, 33 Am. Soc. Intl. L. Proc. 51-63 (1939).
41Roth, supra, note 40 at 62; Rosa Gelbtrunk Claim (United States v. Salvador)
Foreign Relations of the United States (1902) 877, 878.
42 Roth, supra, note 40 at 85-87.
43 Id. at 82.
44 Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 Am. Soc. Intl.
L. Proc. 16, 21 (1910).
45Roth, supra, note 40 at 111. Also see generally Robert B. Ellert, NATO "Fair
Trial" Safeguards: Precursor to an International Bill of Procedural Rights (1963),
16, 18, 55-58.
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"very simple, very fundamental, and of such general acceptance"? It has
been said that attempts to define the standard and give content to its
vague terms "have resulted in the utmost confusion and vagueness.
46
This very vagueness and lack of definition has been accepted and
supported as desirable by the Assistant Legal Advisor, United States
Department of State. She would recommend the minimum standard as to
due process being left defined as a broad concept which would grow with
the times. 47 In our search for perceivable standards, 48 it is granted that a
broad ill-defined concept is subject to perception. But in the specific area
of international due process implemented by observers of multi-national
backgrounds, the lack of definition would be a severe drawback. Since the
individual protectee would normally raise the issue by his own petition, it
is imperative that the rights granted by knowable and understandable by
the layman. There is no automatic international scrutinization in this
scheme, analogous to automatic judicial review. Therefore, both for the
benefit of the petitioner and the third-party observer, it would be highly
desirable for the perceptability of the standard to be as clear as possible.
Furthermore, in constructing a system based on a multilateral
convention, it is necessary to avoid charges and suspicions that the
guarantees of the convention are so broadly drawn that their undefined
precepts could be the basis for unlimited and undesirable interference in
the internal affairs of the signatory States. The establishment of specific
criteria to be protected under the convention would be a healthy step
along the road from intervention by diplomacy and military or economic
force to doctrinal third-party decision-making.4
Indeed, the observable practice of States since the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights has been to specifically itemize procedural
due process concepts. The various draft and effectuated instruments which
have come into being since the Universal Declaration should now be
examined with the aim of selecting the criteria most feasible for our
Inter-American proposal.
(A). The Declarations. Historically, the nature of Declarations has
been to lay the broad basis of hortative principles. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights stated the general right of the individual to
recognition as a person before the law5 and to equal protection of the
law51 without regard to national origin or any other status.52 It declared
46 Frederick Sherwood Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932), 141.
47 Majorie M. Whiteman, 8 Digest of International Law (1967), 701.
48 Franck, supra, note 7 at 122.
49 See Fox, supra, note 21 at 56-60.
50 Sohn, supra, note 3 at 169, Art. 6.
51 Id. Art. 7.
5 2 Id. at 168, Art. 2.
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that in a criminal proceeding the accused is entitled to a presumption of
innocence 0 during a fair and public trial. 54 Several months previously, the
Inter-American community had approved the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man.55 This document had also asserted equality
before the law without distinction as to any factor" and the right of an
accused to an impartial and public trial with a presumption of innocence
until proven guilty.57 While antedating the Universal Declaration, it had
broken further ground by declaring the individual's right to judicially
test the legality of detention and to be accorded a trial without undue
delay.58 These provisions have been incorporated into and are presently
implemented by Article 9 (bis) of the Statute of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights9 and Articles 53-57 of the Commission's
Regulations.60
(B). The Multilateral Treaties. Subsequent to those enunciations of
basic principles, the first detailed enunciation of criminal due process
guarantees was in Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.61 This instru-
ment incorporated the pattern of declaring in one Article the preliminary
rights of prompt notification of the nature of the charges62 and of
proceedings to judicially test the lawfulness of detention 63 and in a second
Article setting forth the various procedures to be granted in the trial of
the case. The following items were listed in Article 6 of the European
Convention and most were included in the subsequent three conventions
discussed infra:
(1) presumption of innocence,
(2) prompt and detailed information as to the nature and cause
of the accusation against him,
(3) right to a translater or interpreter,
(4) adequate time and means for preparation of a defense,
(5) right to defend personally or with the services of counsel who
would be supplied without charge when required by the interests of justice,
(6) trial without undue delay,
53 Id. Art. 11.
54 Id. Art. 10.
55 Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, OEA/SER. L/V/. 4 Rev. (1963).
56 Id. Art. 2.
57 Id. Art. 21.
58 Id. Art. 25.
59 Supra, note 23.
6 0 Reprinted in 1 J. Intl. & Comp. L. 149 (1968).
61 Supra, note 16 at 226-228.
62 Id. Art. 5 (2).
6 Id. Art. 5 (4).
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(7) examination of adverse witnesses,
(8) obtaining the attendance and examination of own witnesses,
(9) public trial (as may be limited by the interests of justice).
Articles 6 and 7 of the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens4 iterated
the foregoing rights except for presumption of innocence and public trial
and, due to its specialized application, stated that an alien accused should
have the opportunity to communicate with a representative of his State
and to have such an individual present at his trial or hearing if allowed
by the forum.65
Two additional highly significant rights were raised in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights66 -the forbidding of
compulsory self-incrimination 7 and the right of review of a conviction by
a higher court.68 All of the previously listed rights contained in the Euro-
pean Convention are included within Articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant.
Finally, the evolutionary development of specific rights of due
process has culminated in the Inter-American Convention on Protection
of Human Rights. 69 The same two preliminary rights and eleven standards
of fair trial of the Covenant are delineated in Articles 6 and 7 of the
Draft Convention. 7
0
Thus, through the progressive construction of these four instruments,
it appears clear that a relatively settled consensus has been reached as to
enumerated criteria of procedural safeguards. Further, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that the overwhelming majority of the members
of the Inter-American community can agree that the terms of Articles
6 and 7 of the Convention should be applied specifically to the trial of
aliens. Given a set of procedural safeguards we can briefly examine the
workings of an observer system.
IV. PRECEDENT FOR A SYSTEM OF TRIAL OBSERVERS
The Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
Regarding the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA) was signed in
London on June 19, 1951 and eventually ratified by 13 nations.71 Article
64 Draft No. 12, Apr. 15, 1961, 55 Am. J. Intl. L. (545, 549-555 (1961).
65 Id. Art. 7 (h) and (i).
66 Supra, note 3 at 180.
67 Id. at 185, Art. 14-3 (g).
68 Id. at 185, Art. 14-5.
69 Supra, note 24.
7o Id. at 677-78.
71 Entered into force for the United States, 23 August 1953, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199
U.N.T.S. 67, The agreement is in effect between Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom
and United States.
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VII of NATO SOFA is concerned with the exercise of criminal juris-
diction over visiting forces. Paragraph 9 of that Article lists certain "fair
trial" safeguards similar to but lesser in scope than the safeguards
specified in Section III, supra. In addition to those safeguards, a visiting
member being prosecuted under the laws of the receiving State is entitled
"to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending
State, and when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representa-
tive present at his trial."' 72 When the Senate of the United States gave its
advice and consent to the ratification of NATO SOFA, it imposed on
the "representative present at" the trial the specific duty of reporting any
denial of the safeguards in paragraph 9.3 The Senate Resolution further
directs that any noncompliance with those safeguards are to be reported
by military authorities to the Department of State with a request for
appropriate action to protect the rights of the accused. It should be noted
that the Senate Resolution is not a treaty reservation and in no manner
alters or limits the terms and application of NATO SOFA. Specifically, as
quoted above, the right of the representative is a qualified right. However,
during at least the first twelve years of operation in NATO countries there
was no instance of a representative being denied admittance to a trial. 74
In carrying out the terms of the Senate Resolution, it is the policy of
the Department of Defense that the enumerated rights of United States
personnel who may be subject to foreign criminal trial and imprisonment
shall be protected to the maximum extent possible.75 This policy means
that although the Resolution applies only to prosecutions falling under the
jurisdiction of NATO SOFA, 76 the same procedures thereunder will be
applied, wherever practicable, in all overseas areas where United States
forces are regularly stationed.77 Through the end of 1965, a total of
72 Id. Art. VII, para. 9 g.
73 Resolution of Ratification, with Reservations, as Agreed to by the Senate on July
15, 1953, T.I.A.S. 36. This resolution raised various problems such as reference to the
procedural safeguards of the United States Constitution and requests for waivers ofjurisdiction under the jurisdictional formulae of Section VII. These problems are
outside the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say that they have not materially
altered the operation of the observer system. For a detailed analysis of criminal
jurisdiction problems under United States Status of Forces agreements generally, see
Joseph M. Snee and Kenneth A. Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal
Jurisdiction (1957).
74 Jack H. Williams, An American's Trial in a Foreign Court: The Role of the
Military's Trial Observer, 34 Military L. Rev. 1, at 28 (1966).
75Section III, United States Department of Defense Directive 5525.1, dated Jan.
20, 1966.
76 This, of course, refers only to the situation of the United States being the sending
State. Under the various provisions of NATO and other SOFA, the United States
could naturally be the receiving State but the number of foreign personnel stationed
in the United States has always been relatively insignificant. Therefore, although the
"representative at trial" provisions apply to any State when it is a sending State, it is
only with the United States trial observer system that we are concerned.
77 Section IV, A., supra, note 75.
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57,916 persons subject to United States SOFA had been tried in the
courts of foreign countries.
78
The Department of Defense policies are implemented by a joint
service regulation, 79 hereafter referred to as AFR 110-12. This regulation
designates responsible officials, directs the production of "country law
studies" for any State in which United States military personnel are
subject to foreign criminal jurisdiction, sets forth procedures for request-
ing waivers of jurisdiction from the receiving State in appropriate cases,
stipulates conditions for the payment of counsel fees and other expenses,
discusses United States policy and appropriate action to be taken in regard
to persons confined by a foreign State, and, in detail, provides for the
requisite qualifications, duties, and reporting obligations of United States
trial observers.
The trial observer must be a lawyer but this requirement may be
waived for the trial of minor offenses. s° Any offense resulting in serious
injury or extensive property damage or which might normally result in a
sentence to confinement, whether or not suspended, is not minor.81 The
observer is not to be considered a member of the defense and is cautioned
not to interject himself into the trial proceedings.8 2 His function is to ob-
serve the proceedings and make a detailed report on the conduct thereof.83
While the observer's report is to contain a factual description of the
proceedings, the observer's ultimate task is to conclude whether there has
been any failure to comply with the procedural safeguards of the SOFA
in effect with the receiving State" and to provide sufficient information to
enable a reviewing official to determine whether the accused received a
fair trial under all the circumstances.ns This latter determination is
required in deference to the spirit of the Senate Resolution which made
reference to the "danger that the accused will not be protected because
of the absence of or denial of constitutional rights he would have in the
U.S."8 6 This somewhat vague language together with the ambiguous
application of the Resolution caused considerable problems for the
services and observers during the first 13 years of NATO SOFA.s7 AFR
78 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee on the Operation of Article VII, NATO
Status of Forces Treaty of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965).
79 Air Force Regulation No. 110-12, Army Regulation No. 27-50, SECNAV Instruc-
tion 5820.4 C, dated 28 June 1967.
8o ld. para. 5 a.
81ld.
82 Id. para. 5 b.
83 Id.
84 Id. para. 5 d.
85 Id. para. 5 e.
8 6 Resolution, supra, note 73.
87 Williams, supra, note 74 at 16-17, 32-35.
Sping 1971
13
Terry: Trial Observers
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
TRIAL OBSERVERS
110-12 now sets forth Department of Defense policy that the quoted
language of the Resolution means "fair trial" safeguards or guarantees
which are considered by the Supreme Court to apply to United States
state court criminal proceedings by virtue of the United States Constitu-
tion's 14th Amendment. Seventeen of these safeguards are set forth in
the regulation.ss Six are duplicative of specific items in Article VII,
paragraph 9 of NATO SOFA and only four-a requirement that criminal
statutes be definite and specific as to standards of guilt and three
prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure, bills of attainder
and in absentia trial-are not included as either substantive or procedural
rights in the two most recent conventions discussed in Section III, supra.
They are not deemed to be crucial procedural rights within the scope
of this article.
What has been the value of the United States observer system? A
detailed study of this question was done in 196689 by interviewing or
obtaining questionnaires from forty-one observers who had been in official
attendance at over 2600 trials in eighteen countries. The major conclusion
of the study was that, although the report itself served the required
purposes of collecting general data and of supplying specific information
in those few cases when an opinion of denial of "fair trial" procedure was
reached, the most important contribution of the observer was his actual
presence at pre-trial proceedings and the trial itself.90 He was, almost
without exception, cordially received.9' Personnel of the receiving State
acknowledged that he was fulfilling an international obligation and
the observer felt that he was serving notice to the forum that the sending
State was sufficiently concerned with its personnel to send a legal
officer to the proceedings.
92
V. HOPES FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN THE AMERICAS
Compulsory submission to adjudication with binding judgments is
not a sine qua non of my proposal. If it were, the writing of this article
would serve little useful purpose. In my concluding next Section, I will
iterate the various benefits, short of that dimly glimpsed panacea, which
I feel would flow directly from limited third-party observation of criminal
procedural due process rights. But a cursory look at current and proposed
future implementation of human rights in the Americas will present
a more rounded picture of the likely process through which the submitted
observer's report will pass.
Under the current Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on
88 AFR 110-12, supra, note 79, Attachment 2.
89 Williams, supra, note 74.
90 Id. at 45-49.
91 Id. at 48, note 225.
92 Id. at 48-49.
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss2/8
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW (2)
Human Rights,9 3 under which the observer reports might be processed for
the foreseeable future, the Commission may receive complaints of human
rights violations from any person or group of persons or by associations
that are legally established.94 There will be no action on a communication
prior to exhaustion of local remedies.95 Accepted communications are
forwarded to the government concerned so that information regarding the
complaint can be obtained and forwarded to the Commission." If
the alleged violation is confirmed, a report on the case will be prepared
and recommendations made to the government concerned. 7 If these
recommendations are not adopted within a reasonable time, the Commis-
sion will present its report to the Inter-American Conference or to the
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 98 If those bodies
make no observations on the Commission's recommendations and if the
government concerned has not yet adopted the recommendations,
the Commission may publish its report.9 9 In reference to techniques such
as the Commission now employs, it has been said:
While a number of methods for international protection of individ-
uals have demonstrated their usefulness, those which already have
been of greatest benefit to the victims of oppression and which
appear to hold the most potential for development during and
immediately following the 1968 International Year for Human
Rights are impartial investigation, followed by negotiation, and
where necessary, publication.100
Under Chapter VII of the Inter-American Convention on Protection
of Human Rights'01 the Commission would continue to operate in much
the same manner except that it could additionally receive complaints from
States Parties if the complaining and complained against States had both
recognized the competence of the Commission in regard to such
complaints.1 2 The Commission or States Parties would have the right to
submit otherwise unresolved cases to an Inter-American Court of Human
Rights'03 if the complained against State had recognized the binding
jurisdiction of the Court.1°4
The provisions for jurisdiction and operation of the Inter-American
93 Supra, note 60.
94 Id. Arts. 37 and 53, 154, 157.
95 Id. Art. 54, 158.
96 Id. Art. 42, 155.
97 Id. Art. 56, 158.
98 Id. Art. 57, 158.
99 Id.
100 Carey, supra, note 2 at 324.
101 Convention, supra, note 24 at 685-689.
102 Id. Art. 45, 687.
10 3 Id. Art. 51,589 and Art. 61,691.
104 Id. Art. 62, 691.
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Commission and Court are closely related to the similar provisions of the
European Convention regarding the matching organs of that system,1
5
but several significant variances should be noted. The Inter-American
Commission could receive complaints from a person, group of persons, or
legally constituted association without the complained against State having
declared that it recognized such competence in the Commission. 0 6 The
Inter-American Court would be composed of seven members from as
many States rather than a judge from each State Party. 1 7 If a judge were
a national of a State which was a party in a case before the Court, he
would not be recused, but any party not represented by a regular judge
would have the right to appoint an ad hoc judge of its choice.' 8
These evolutionary developments beyond the European system are
distinct improvements. Granted that the individual would still not be given
the status of a party enabled to bring cases directly to the Court, it should
again be pointed out that the European Court has consistently "treated
the petitioner's interests as those of a party."'0 °9 Furthermore, the proviso
that the Inter-American Commission would not be dependent on State
Party approval before receiving complaints from individuals would likely
result in the creation of an abundance of case law regarding the "fair
trial" safeguards. Such has occurred as a result of the workings of the
European Commission" and in reference to that Commission it has been
said that "it is not unreasonable to assume that the longer the Commission
performs its functions, the more difficult politically it will be for individual
governments to withhold renewal of their periodic acceptance of its
jurisdiction. With time, adverse governmental reactions will therefore
justify less cause for alarm and permit correspondingly greater judicial
creativity." ' The passage of time may prove these same comments
to be true regarding the individual's status before the Inter-American
Court and acceptance of that Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
105 Convention, supra, note 16, Sections III and IV, 234-248.
106 Convention, supra, note 24, Art. 44, 687. Compare with European Convention,
supra, note 12, Art. 25, 236.
107 Convention, supra, note 24, Art. 52, 690. Compare with European Convention,
supra, note 12, Art. 38, 242.
108 Convention, supra, note 24, Art. 55, 590. Compare this with the similar practice
under Article 43 of the European Convention, supra, note 12, 244, of special
procedures to insure that each State party to a case is "represented" by a national
judge or one of its choice. Such court-stuffing by countervailing national judges as
practiced under Article 31 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Louis
B. Sohn, Basic Documents of the United Nations, 221-232, at 236 (1968), is severely
criticized in Franck, supra, note 7 at 253-255.
109 del Russo, supra, note 17.
10 For an excellent detailed analysis of the European Commission's case law
regarding the safeguards of Article 6 of the European Convention see Thomas
Bergenthal, Comparative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the
European Human Rights Convention, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 18 (1967).
in Id. at 53.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The preceding Section indicated some very real shortcomings of the
human rights implementation and enforcement procedures contained in
existing and proposed systems. States shall not in a figurative twinkling
of an eye renounce the benefits of deciding by pressure and power nor
will they quiescently allow a rending of the shroud of sovereignty which
has served as at least a theoretical barrier to extranational meddling and
the unwanted intrusion of alien ideas or mores. But it is equally clear
that the "sense" of the individual possessing certain rights which are
enforceable within the international community is rapidly growing in
acceptance. To deny the emergence of this strong "sense" is to deny much
of the United Nations' production of resolutions, declarations, and draft
conventions. Even more conclusive evidence of this feeling in the breasts
of States and men are the achievements, halting as they may be, of
regional organizations.
Therefore, notwithstanding the difficulties and shortcomings which
would be inherent due to deeply inbred State hesitancy, I do not think
it unrealistic to hope for a relatively early acceptance of the regime
proposed by this article. To sum up the discussions and arguments of the
preceding pages, I would suggest the following five factors as benefits
which would flow from adoption and operation of the proposal.
It would serve as a limiting wedge into the concept of "domestic
jurisdiction." If human rights are to become enforceable beyond the
national level there must be beginnings and there must be acceptance
of even narrow areas which ascend above purely national concern. The
treatment of aliens is a singularly appropriate area.
Creation of international mechanisms to oversee certain alien rights
would serve to lessen or eliminate the frictions and crises between States
caused by diplomatic intervention and economic or military pressure. If
an individual rather than a State were recognized as the real party in
interest on one side of the dispute, the matter is placed more in its proper
perspective and the entire area of contention is cooled down.
The insertion of observers at the level of initial criminal proceedings
would obviate the major undesirable feature of the "exhaustion of local
remedies" rule. Acts and events would be documented at the earliest
possible moment and would be preserved for subsequent dispute settle-
ment. This documentative presence of the observer would be totally
passive while the national remedies are being pursued and would not
unduly intrude on the orderly workings of the forum State's judicial
system. No conclusion as to the protection or violation of the alien's
rights would be made prior to the exhaustion of local remedies.
Agreement on definite "fair-trial" procedural safeguards would be of
specific value regionally and would indirectly further the chances for
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world-wide agreement on and codification of such safeguards. Absent
supranational legislatures, the development of concrete perceivable
standards by evolutional multilateral conventions should be given a high
priority. The Americas would do well to finally and absolutely bury the
dichotomous "national treatment-minimum standard" argument. The
value of making clear to the individual and the decision-maker what rights
are to be protected should transcend any past advantages flowing from
sanctification of varying local usages or from self-perceivable vagueness.
Lastly, and this is a fundamental tenet of the proposal, a real start
would occur toward the development of a regional civil service. For the
first time an impartial third-party would be injected into the earliest
stages of dispute settlement. His presence would be highly visible to the
administrators of national justice. Although not a decision-maker, he
could be seen as evidence of international impartiality and it is imperative
for any future widespread acceptance by States of third-party decision-
making that this possibility for impartiality be apparent and recognizable.
It is submitted that the Inter-American community can make a tan-
gible and consequential contribution to the protection of human rights and
the rule of world law. There is a problem and there are precedents for
attacking the problem. It is an opportunity for the nations of this hemi-
sphere to reaffirm that they exist of humans, by humans and for humans.
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 4 [1972], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol4/iss2/8
